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Abstract
Using data supplied by InformedSources I nd additional aws in the
ACCC analysis of FuelWatch.
First, the drop in petrol prices that is so visually convincing in the ACCC
chart S1 is in fact an artifact of the method of data construction and can
be attributed primarily to increases in prices in Adelaide and Melbourne
 events that had nothing to do with Western Australia or FuelWatch.
Second, redoing the analysis using Sydney as the point of reference and
adding prices in other cities as explanatory variables lead to results that
contradict ACCC ndings. First I nd that the two best models that I
estimate yield the conclusion that Fuelwatch either increased petrol prices
in Western Australia by a small amount or had no e¤ect.
Third, I nd that the entry of Woolworths and Coles into the Western
Australian market had the e¤ect of reducing unleaded petrol prices Perth
by about 2.67 per cent relative to Sydney.
1 Introduction
Data digitization procedures were used by Harding (2008) to approximate the
data behind Appendix S of the ACCC (2007) report into Petrol pricing. The
ACCC continues to refuse to release the data behind its analysis.
InformedSources the company that compile the price data used by the ACCC
have provided access to the weekly, daily and monthly retail price data for
unleaded petrol (ulp) and diesel. This data is not public but I am permitted
to use the data in my analysis so long as I only publish transformations that
do not permit someone to recover the actual data.1 This restriction protects
InformedSources commercial interests but does not place a signicant restriction
on me as an econometrician.
1 InformedSources have reviewed the paper and conrmed that I have not breached con-
dentiality of their data. The paper presents the results of my own analysis and does not
necessarily reect the views of InformedSources. All responsibility for errors and omissions is
mine alone.
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To meet this restriction I focus attention on di¤erences of prices, ratios of
prices or logarithms of price ratios. It is not possible to return to the original
data when it is so transformed.2
The overarching objective of this paper is to build on the ndings in Harding
(2008) and show that it is possible to use the InformedSources data to undertake
an econometric analysis of FuelWatch that is more robust than that reported by
the ACCC. This paper is a rst draft comments and suggestions are welcome.
Against that background, this paper has three subsidiary objectives. The
rst, undertaken in section 2, is to provide a discussion of the main features of
the data provided by InformedSources while remaining within the constraints
described above. The second, undertaken in section 3, is to discuss and evaluate
the approach used by the ACCC to construct the nominal retail margin used in
Appendix S of the petrol report. The third objective is to reassess FuelWatch
using the data for all of the capital cities. The results of this reanalysis are
reported in section 4. Conclusions are in section 5.
2 Main features of the weekly data
2.1 Unleaded petrol
2.1.1 Terminal gate prices
Terminal gate prices (TGP) for unleaded petrol (ulp) are available from the
Australian institute of Petroleum website starting from January 2004.3 Four
main points emerge from Figure 1.4 First terminal gate prices move in a similar
way across the ve largest cities in Australia. Second, between mid 2005 and
March 2008 the terminal gate prices uctuated in a range between 106 cents
per litre and 136 cents per litre. Third, from late March 2008 to early July
TGPs increased by about 30 cents per litre (23 percent). This sharp increase is
the cause of much of the economic pain being felt in Australia and most likely
explains much of the decline in consumer and business sentiment. The fourth
point is that terminal gate prices for unleaded petrol show little evidence of
calendar variation. This suggests that the daily variation in unleaded petrol
prices observed in the main capital cities is most likely the result of calendar
e¤ects on consumer demand for petrol.
The percentage deviation from the (volume weighted) national average of
terminal gate unleaded petrol prices is shown in Figure 2. Three main points
to emerge from this gure. First the terminal gate price in Perth in early 2004
was about 3 per cent above the national average. Second, for cities such as
2 It is worth noting here that the ACCC data is also transformed in such a way that one
cannot go from it back to the original InformedSources data. Thus, it is not the case that
the ACCCs refusal to release the data can be justied on the basis of their protecting the
commercial interests of InformedSources.
3http://www.aip.com.au/pricing/tgp.htm
4The gures are in colour so the paper is easier to read if it is printed on a colour printer.
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Figure 1: Nominal Price of Unleaded Petrol at Terminal Gate in Various Capital
Cities (Cents Per Litre)
80.0
90.0
100.0
110.0
120.0
130.0
140.0
150.0
160.0
1-Jan-
2004
1-Jul-
2004
1-Jan-
2005
1-Jul-
2005
1-Jan-
2006
1-Jul-
2006
1-Jan-
2007
1-Jul-
2007
1-Jan-
2008
1-Jul-
2008
Sydney
Melbourne
Brisbane
Adelaide
Perth
N
om
in
al
 p
ric
e 
of
 u
nl
ea
de
d 
Pe
tr
ol
at
 T
er
m
in
al
 G
at
e 
(c
en
ts
 p
er
 li
tr
e)
3
Melbourne the terminal gate price of unleaded petrol was about 1.5 per cent
below the national average in early 2004. Third, there has been a substantial
narrowing in the di¤erences between the capital cities in the terminal gate price
of unleaded petrol. This nding has implications for the ACCCs method of
calculating the east-west di¤erence in the nominal retail margin.
Figure 2: Percentage deviation of nominal price of unleaded petrol at terminal
gate from the (volume weighted) national average selected capital cities (per
cent)
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2.1.2 Retail prices
The percentage deviation of weekly retail unleaded petrol prices in Sydney,
Melbourne and Adelaide from those in Perth are shown in Figure 3.5 Points
above the zero line are dates at which prices in Perth are cheaper than in the
other capitals and those below the zero line are dates at which unleaded petrol
is cheaper in the other cities. Three main points emerge from this gure. First,
there are calender e¤ects so that prices vary according to week as well as the
much discussed variation within a week. Second, the calendar variation makes
it hard to determine from the graph whether prices were systematically a¤ected
5The exact calculation is 100  log( ULPi;t
ULPPerth;t
) where ULPi;t is the price of unleaded
petrol in city i at week t. This is approximately equal to the percentage di¤erence between
the price in city i and the price in Perth.
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by FuelWatch. Third, there is some visual evidence that prices in Perth were
on average relatively higher before 2004 and may on average be a bit lower after
2004.
Figure 3: Percentage deviation of nominal retail price of unleaded petrol in
Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide from price in Perth (per cent)
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Comparable information for Brisbane prices is shown in Figure 4. Brisbane
is shown separately because the 9.2 cent per litre subsidy means that prices in
Brisbane have always been lower than in Perth. Also as is shown in the Figure
the part of the subsidy that goes to consumers has not kept pace with the price
of petrol and this is the cause of the apparent time trend in Figure 4. In part
this time trend reects the fact that over time less of the subsidy has been
passed on to consumers.
There are several ways of removing part or all of the calender e¤ects. A
simple approach is to take an 11-week centred moving average as is done in
Figure 5 for Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide The main point to emerge from
Figure 5 is that between January 1998 and May 2000 the price of unleaded
petrol in Adelaide and Melbourne was respectively 2.0 per cent and 3.7 per
cent below that in Perth. But the price in Sydney was on average only 0.7 per
cent below that in Perth over this period. I will return to this fact later when
discussing the ACCC data construction.
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Figure 4: Percentage deviation of nominal retail price of unleaded petrol in
Brisbane from price in Perth (per cent)
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Figure 5: Eleven week centred moving average of the percentage deviation of
nominal retail price of unleaded petrol in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide from
price in Perth (per cent)
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2.2 Diesel
2.2.1 Terminal gate prices
The percentage deviation of weekly terminal gate prices of diesel are also avail-
able from the Australian Institute of Petroleum. The percentage deviation from
the (volume weighted) national average of terminal gate diesel prices are shown
in Figure 6. The main points to emerge from this gure are rstly, as with ulp,
terminal gate prices for diesel were somewhat higher in Perth at the beginning of
2004. Second, for Melbourne the terminal gate price of diesel was consistently
lower than in Perth throughout the whole period. As with ulp, in 2007 and
2008, there was a narrowing in the percentage deviation of diesel prices from
the national average. This was most likely caused by the higher world oil price.
Figure 6: Percentage deviation of nominal price of diesel at terminal gate from
the (volume weighted) national average selected capital cities (per cent)
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1-Jan-2004 1-Jul-2004 1-Jan-2005 1-Jul-2005 1-Jan-2006 1-Jul-2006 1-Jan-2007 1-Jul-2007 1-Jan-2008 1-Jul-2008
Sydney
Melbourne
Brisbane
Adelaide
Perth
D
ie
se
l -
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 n
at
io
na
l a
ve
ra
ge
Te
rm
in
al
 G
at
e 
Pr
ic
e 
(p
er
 c
en
t)
2.2.2 Retail prices
The percentage deviation of weekly retail prices of diesel prices in Sydney, Mel-
bourne and Adelaide from those in Perth are shown in Figure 7. The most
notable feature of this chart is that, unlike ulp, there is no weekly calender
variation in diesel prices. This suggests that the strong weekly uctuations in
unleaded petrol prices reects the particular economic conditions in that market.
The other notable feature of this gure is that retail diesel prices in Melbourne
8
are consistently lower than in Perth, Sydney or Adelaide. The reason for this
di¤erence is unknown.
Figure 7: Percentage deviation of nominal retail price of diesel in Sydney, Mel-
bourne and Adelaide from price in Perth (per cent)
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3 The ACCC approach for constructing the east-
west di¤erence in the nominal retail margin
for petrol
The ACCC constructed a series that represents the di¤erence between the nom-
inal retail margin on petrol in Perth
 
mPertht

and the nominal retail margin
on petrol in the eastern capital cities mEastt . The ACCC described this data
as follows
The data series was constructed using pricing information supplied
by Informed Sources and Platts. The series tested was a measure
of price margin that removes factors from the retail price that are
beyond the scope of FuelWatch to a¤ect, such as net taxes, fuel
quality premiums and ex-renery petrol prices. ACCC report p375.
Details of how the di¤erence in the nominal price margin, which I denote
as mt, are calculated are provided on page 375 of the ACCC report and the
9
formulasare set out below.
mPertht = (Retail price-lagged Mogas95 price-net taxes - fuel quality premium)P e r t h
mEastt = (Retail price-lagged Mogas95 price-net taxes - fuel quality premium)A ve r a g e o f e a s t e r n c a p i t a l s
mt= m
Perth
t  mEastt
Harding (2008) observes that the ACCCs description of howmt is calculated
is incomplete and provides a discussion of issues that are not addressed in the
ACCC report. Ideally, I would like to redo the ACCC calculation but the
Mogas95 price series is expensive (about $US2000) so I have not purchased it.
More importantly because I dont have information on exactly which taxes and
subsidies the ACCC used and I dont have information on the fuel quality premia
it is impossible to reconstruct the ACCC data from the InformedSources data.
This means that until the ACCC releases their data the most accurate public
information on mt is the data that I digitized from Chart S1.
However, to some extent the issue of whether or not the ACCC release the
data is becoming an issue of secondary importance because there is su¢ cient in-
formation in the InformedSources data to discern additional aws in the ACCC
approach that make the variable mt essentially meaningless. Specically, move-
ments in mt can come from two sources viz, movements in mPertht and those
movements that come from mEastt it is evident from Figure 5 that much of the
apparent structural break visible in Chart S1 arises because of changes in the
structure of petrol prices in Melbourne and Adelaide. Clearly it is incorrect to
attribute such movements in unleaded petrol prices in other states to Western
Australian FuelWatch.
A second issue that arises here is that as discussed in conjunction with
Figure 4 there appears to be some variation in the proportion of the fuel subsidy
in Brisbane that is passed on to consumers. Since the ACCC is not explicit
about how they adjusted for taxes and subsidies we do not know whether they
corrected for variation in the pass through of the subsidy.
The two features of mt discussed above mean that it is not a meaningful
variable for measuring the e¤ect of events such as FuelWatch on the retail price
of unleaded petrol.
4 Estimating the e¤ect of FuelWatch using un-
leaded petrol price data for ve capital cities
An alternative approach for estimating the e¤ect of FuelWatch is to use Sydney
as the point of comparison as unleaded petrol prices in that city had a far more
stable relationship with those in Perth over the period 1998 to 2008. Thus the
dependent variable is pt
pt = 100
PPertht   PSydneyt
PSydneyt
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I also constructed three other variables that reect the percentage deviation in
other capital cities from the price in Sydney
it = 100
P it   PSydneyt
PSydneyt
i = a (Adelaide); b (Brisbane); m (Melbourne)
These variables at ; 
b
t ; 
m
t ; contain potentially useful information about
movements in pt that are caused by factors which are common across some or
all of the Australian cities. Recall from the discussion in Harding (2008) that
when using dummy variables to measure the e¤ect of an event we are using
the "after this therefore because of this" form of logic which is suspect in the
sciences. To make this form of logic less susceptible to criticism it is important
to make a serious attempt to control for other potential explanations. A straight
forward way of doing this is to include the variables at ; 
b
t ; 
m
t and their lags
in the regression.
Finally, I construct dummy variables that represent the creation of Fuel-
Watch on 2 January 2001 (FWt), the entry of Woolworths into the Perth market
in December 2003 (WWt) and the entry of Coles into the Perth market in March
2004 (Colest). Each of these dummy variables takes the value zero before the
date of the event and the value one afterwards.
4.1 Regression model
The regression I use allows for lags in the dependent variable (pt ) and in the
explanatory variables at ; 
b
t ; 
m
t . Specically
pt = +FWt+WWt+Colest+t+
KX
i=1
i
p
t i+
KX
i=0

ai 
a
t i + 
b
i
b
t i + 
m
i 
m
t i

+"t
(1)
The coe¢ cients on these dummy variables reects the impact of the event on
pt : Thus  measures the instantaneous percentage change in the Perth ulp price
relative to the Sydney ulp price that is attributable to FuelWatch controlling
for:
 the entry of Woolworths and Coles;
 the common e¤ects experienced across cities; and
 the dynamics of petrol prices.
Similarly,  and  measures the instantaneous percentage changes in the
Perth ulp price relative to the Sydney ulp price that are attributable to the
entry of Woolworths and Coles respectively controlling for FuelWatch and other
factors. Here it is important to note that because the entry of these two retailers
occurred so close together it is di¢ cult to distinguish their separate e¤ects. It
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is therefore prudent to interpret  +  as the cumulative e¤ect of entry of these
businesses and not to place too much emphasis on the individual coe¢ cients.
The parameter  controls for any time trend that may be in the dependent
or explanatory variables.
The parameters i measure lags in adjustment of prices. The long run ef-
fects of the three events allowed for can be calculated as follows (letting a +
superscript denote long run parameter values)
 The long run e¤ect of FuelWatch is + which is calculated as
+ =

1 PKi=1 i
 The long run e¤ect of Woolworths entry (see caveat above) is + which is
calculated as
+ =

1 PKi=1 i
 The long run e¤ect of Coles entry (see caveat above) is + which is calcu-
lated as
+ =

1 PKi=1 i
The regression above is a generalization of the approach taken by the ACCC
in a particular sense. Specically, the ACCC approach is the special case where
the following conditions are met:
1. a0 = 
b
0 = 
b
0 = 1;
2. ai = 
b
i = 
b
i =  i for all i = 1; ::K;.and
3. Sydney prices are used as the reference to put the nominal price di¤erence
into real terms.
The model does not contain direct allowance for seasonal e¤ects through,
for example, weekly dummy variables. This is because the weekly e¤ects seem
broadly similar across the cities and thus weekly e¤ects are likely to be con-
trolled for in the explanatory variables at ; 
b
t ; 
m
t if omitted weekly e¤ects are
important they will show up when we inspect the residuals.
4.2 Estimation and model selection
The regression model can be estimated using ordinary least squares. To imple-
ment the regression it is necessary to choose a value for K that is su¢ ciently
large as to account for the dynamics. I chose K=12 weeks which is almost one
quarter. Once K is selected there are two approaches to regressions like this.
One is to simply estimate the model for a given K. Models estimated in this
way have the feature that provided K is su¢ ciently large they are consistent
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in the sense that for a large enough sample one can get arbitrarily close to the
true value. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is not parsimonious and
there is some loss of e¢ ciency which will be reected in wider condence inter-
vals. The second approach is to use information criterion to trade of parsimony
and t. Two popular methods are the Akike information criterion (AIC) and
the Schwartz criterion (SC). Letting b2" (m) denote the estimated variance of "t
when m parameters are freely estimated the AIC and SC are given as
AIC = ln b2" (m) + 2mT
SC = ln b2" (m) + 2m lnTT
Where lnx is the natural logarithm of x and T is the number of observations.
Hannan and Quinn (1979) showed that the AIC leads to an inconsistent esti-
mator of K in vector auto regressions  (1) can be thought of as an equation
from a vector autoregression. They also showed that SC leads to a consistent
estimator of K. Here consistency means that as the sample size increases the
probability of selecting the correct value of K goes to one. In many instances
this argument is used to suggest that one should prefer SC over AIC. However,
it can also be shown that for T>8 the SC selects a more parsimonious model
that does the AIC. Thus the risk in using the AIC criterion is a loss of e¢ ciency
from selecting a model with too many parameters while the risk with the SC
criterion is selecting a model with too few parameters and thus creating a bias
where variables that are indeed important are excluded from the regression.
Good econometric analysis requires that the investigator balance these risks.
The required balance is likely to vary with the features of the questions investi-
gated. In cases where the "after this therefore because of this" form of logic is
being used it is important that other potential explanations are excluded and
this favours the use of criteria such as AIC over SC when selecting the regres-
sors. However, so that the reader can judge for themselves I will report the
following models:
 Unrestricted model ie all parameters estimated;
 Restricted model selected by AIC;
 Restricted model selected by SC; and
 Model with only dummy variables (ie no lags and no prices from other
cities).
4.3 Results
The results for the unrestricted model are in Table 1. The model ts well and
there is no signicant evidence of serial correlation in the residuals. A regression
of the squared residuals on the explanatory variables yielded a F statistic for
the test of 0.8 with a p-value of 0.8 so there is no evidence to cause a rejection of
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the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.6 These two conclusions mean that the
standard errors reported here are appropriate and there is nothing to be gained
from using hetroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Table 1: Results from unrestricted model
Panel 1: Dummy coe¢ cients (parameters of interest)
coe¤    
Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e
. 2:55 0:96 0:12 0:33  0:22 0:51  0:67 0:54
Panel 2: Other coe¢ cients
i 
a
i 
b
i 
m
i
Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e
0 na na 0:28 0:049 0:23 0:052 0:13 0:045
1 0:22 0:046  0:11 0:056  0:10 0:061 0:02 0:049
2 0:22 0:047  0:05 0:056  0:04 0:062  0:06 0:049
3  0:04 0:047 0:08 0:056 0:03 0:062  0:07 0:050
4 0:15 0:047  0:18 0:055 0:04 0:062 0:05 0:050
5  0:06 0:048 0:05 0:056 0:02 0:061 0:05 0:050
6 0:04 0:048 0:06 0:056  0:01 0:061  0:07 0:050
7 0:06 0:048  0:07 0:056 0:03 0:061 0:01 0:050
8 0:07 0:048  0:05 0:056 0:01 0:061 0:04 0:050
9  0:09 0:047 0:02 0:056 0:02 0:061  0:08 0:050
10 0:09 0:047 0:07 0:056  0:06 0:060 0:07 0:050
11 0:03 0:047  0:07 0:056  0:07 0:060 0:04 0:050
12  0:03 0:046  0:01 0:051 0:11 0:051  0:05 0:046
Sum 0:66 0:02 0:21 0:08
R2 = 0:553 R
2
= 0:501 T = 533 HetroTest = 0:821b" = 1:486 df = 477
Panel 3: Long run coe¢ cients
Coe¤ + + + +
Est 7:65 0:36  0:66  2:01
The unrestricted model suggests that the instantaneous e¤ect of FuelWatch
was to raise unleaded petrol prices in Perth relative to Sydney by 0:12 of one
per cent. But since the standard error is 0:33, thus 95 per cent condence
intervals will include zero. That is the instantaneous e¤ect of FuelWatch is
not statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero. The long run e¤ect is to raise
unleaded petrol prices in Perth relative to Sydney by 0:36 of one per cent. I have
not calculated the standard error for this long run e¤ect but it seems unlikely
that the long run e¤ect would be signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The instantaneous e¤ect of the entry of Woolworths and Coles was to lower
unleaded petrol prices by 0:89 of one per cent (0:22 + 0:67) this e¤ect was also
6Given the sample size is so large there is little point in worrying about the distinction
between the F distribution and the 2 distribution.
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not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The long run mean e¤ect of the entry
of these two retailers was to lower prices of unleaded petrol by 2:67 per cent
relative to Sydney.
Results from the model selected by the Aikike information criteria (AIC)
are in table 2. Application of AIC leads to 33 parameters being set to zero.
This has relatively small impact on the overall conclusions. There continues
to be little evidence of hetroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The estimated in-
stantaneous impact of FuelWatch is to lower unleaded prices by 0:01 of one
percent (essentially zero) with a standard deviation of 0:23 of one per cent. So
the 95 per cent condence interval for the instantaneous e¤ect of FuelWatch is
( 0:46; 0:45): The estimated long run e¤ect of FuelWatch in this model is to
lower unleaded petrol prices by 0:03 of one per cent.
Table 2: Results from model selected by AIC criteria
Panel 1: Dummy coe¢ cients (parameters of interest)
coe¤    
Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e
. 1:74 0:603  0:01 0:23  0:20 0:464  0:79 0:50
Panel 2: Other coe¢ cients
i 
a
i 
b
i 
m
i
Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e
0 na na 0:28 0:046 0:25 0:048 0:15 0:038
1 0:21 0:041  0:12 0:047  0:11 0:049
2 0:19 0:041  0:08 0:038
3
4 0:16 0:041  0:10 0:040
5
6
7
8 0:09 0:039
9  0:09 0:038
10 0:09 0:039
11  0:10 0:044
12 0:10 0:045  0:07 0:037
Sum 0:65 0:06 0:14 0:00
R2 = 0:528 R
2
= 0:510 T = 533 HetroTest = 1:5b" = 1:472 df = 513
Panel 3: Long run coe¢ cients
Coe¤ + + + +
Est 4:97  0:03  0:57  2:26
Application of the Schwartz Criteria (SC) leads to the model reported in
table 3. This model also show little evidence of hetrocedasticty or autocorrela-
tion. Comparison of tables 3 and 2 indicate that the SC leads to the omitting
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of several variables even though the t-statistics exceed 2 (ie are signicant at
the 5% level). Given that we are using the "after this therefore because of this"
mode of logic it seems inappropriate to use the SC as it will lead to the exclusion
of potentially signicant explanatory variables and thus bias the results.
Table 3: Results from model selected by SC criteria
Panel 1: Dummy coe¢ cients (parameters of interest)
coe¤    
Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e
. 2:27 0:44  0:18 0:21  0:16 0:463  1:02 0:49
Panel 2: Other coe¢ cients
i 
a
i 
b
i 
m
i
Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e
0 na na 0:31 0:045 0:17 0:038 0:15 0:038
1 0:19 0:040  0:14 0:045
2 0:20 0:040  0:10 0:038
3
4 0:19 0:040  0:10 0:040
Sum 0:58 0:07 0:17 0:05
R2 = 0:500 R
2
= 0:510 T = 533 HetroTest = 1:5b" = 1:496 df = 513
Panel 3: Long run coe¢ cients
Coe¤ + + + +
Est 5:40  0:43  0:38  2:43
The results of estimating a model in which all the prices in other cities are
omitted is reported in Table 4. This model is of interest because it is similar in
approach to the models implicitly used by the ACCC in appendix S. There are
several indications that this model is inappropriate. One is that compared with
the model selected by AIC the R2has fallen from 0:528 to 0:164 suggesting that
the omitted variables had a role to play in explaining unleaded petrol prices 
many of the variables omitted had t-statistics of over 2 some had t-statistics over
7. Another indication that this model is inadequate is that the Durbin-Watson
statistic is very low suggesting autocorrelation in the disturbances. Attempting
to correct for this using hetroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors (as the ACCC does) would be inappropriate because the fundamental
problem is not one of serial correlation but omitted variables.
5 Conclusion
The ACCC said in it document Petrol  Further Econometric Analysis Under-
taken by ACCC that
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Table 4: Results from heavily restricted model akin to that used by ACCC
Panel 1: Dummy coe¢ cients
coe¤    
Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e Est S.e
. 0:38 na 0:86 na 1:30 na  3:1 na
Panel 2: Other coe¢ cients
R2 = 0:164 R
2
= 0:159 T = 545
DW = 1:2 b" = 1:92 df = 541
The purpose of this econometric analysis has been to satisfy the
ACCC that the introduction of a national FuelWatch scheme na-
tionally would not, based on the experience in Western Australia,
lead to consumers paying higher prices for Petrol.
From the econometric analysis, on a conservative basis, the ACCC
can say that there is no evidence that the introduction of the Fu-
elWatch in Western Australia led to any increase in prices and it
appears to have resulted in a small price decrease overall.
Harding (2008) showed that econometrics behind this conclusion was deeply
awed and that when one applied more appropriate econometric tests to data
obtained by digitizing a graph in the ACCC report the estimated e¤ect was
much smaller than that found by the ACCC and the 95% condence interval
included zero so that it was no longer possible to conclude that FuelWatch did
no harm.
InformedSources provided me with access to some of the petrol retail price
data that was used by the ACCC. While I still do not have su¢ cient data to
redo the ACCC calculations the InformedSources data is very useful as it yields
two new insights.
First, the dramatic fall in Perth ulp prices relative to the eastern states in
May 2000 to December 2000 that was so visually compelling in the ACCCs
chart S1 was in fact due primarily to price changes in Adelaide and Melbourne
and thus can have nothing to do with events in Western Australia.
Second, the relationship between ulp prices in Perth and Sydney seems rel-
atively stable so it is possible to redo the ACCC analysis using the percentage
deviation of Perth ulp prices from those in Sydney. It is also possible to construct
similar variables for the other capitals and use these as explanatory variables in
a regression where they allow one to control for a range of factors a¤ecting ulp
prices. In this set up the ACCC approach can be viewed as requiring a special
set of parameter restrictions. There is no evidence that these restrictions hold.
This suggests that the ACCC approach, because it omits these variables, yields
estimates of the e¤ects of FuelWatch that are biased and inconsistent. The
latter econometric term means that no matter how large the sample the esti-
mates would never converge to the true but unknown parameter representing
the impact of FuelWatch.
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The unrestricted model that I estimate will yield consistent but somewhat
ine¢ cient estimates. It suggests that the long run e¤ect of FuelWatch in Western
Australia was to raise ulp prices by 0:36 of one per cent. I have not calculated the
condence interval for this estimate but expect that it will most likely include
zero so that the e¤ect is not statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The model selected by the Aikike information criteria may omit some vari-
ables that should be in the model and could therefore result in inconsistent
estimates but it has increased e¢ ciency. This model yields estimates of the
e¤ects of FuelWatch that are essentially zero in both the short and long run.
The Schwartz criteria imposes too many restrictions on the model to be
plausible. Indeed it results in omission of variables where the t-statistic on the
coe¢ cient exceeds 2.0 so it is very likely that this model would lead to biased
and inconsistent estimates of the e¤ects of FuelWatch.
In the document Petrol  Further Econometric Analysis Undertaken by
ACCC , the ACCC claims that
The analysis of the structural breaks indicated that the entry of
Coles into Perth was an event that may have had a price impact.
However, its impact was small compared to the break around the
time of the introduction of FuelWatch.
The analysis in this paper shows that this conclusion is false. I have already
shown that the structural break attributed to FuelWatch by the ACCC a)
occurred before FuelWatch was introduced and b) was caused primarily by price
rises in Adelaide and Melbourne not by price falls in Perth.
Moreover, when I redo the analysis using Sydney prices as the point of com-
parison and with other explanatory variables I nd that the entry of Woolworths
and Coles into Western Australia resulted in long run price falls of about 2.67
per cent. Clearly, the entry of these two retailers had an e¤ect on petrol prices
that is one or two orders of magnitude larger than the e¤ect of FuelWatch.
Moreover entry of these rms reduced petrol prices whereas even the direction
of e¤ect of FuelWatch is unclear.
Any piece of econometric work has qualications. The main ones here are
that it would be useful to have access to the Platts Mogas95 price data , the
data on net taxes and subsidies and the fuel quality premium. However, the
reader of this paper who has access to such data can easily check whether such
data change the results I obtain. This can be done by including the variables
mentioned above in the regression and checking whether any of the conclusions
are modied.
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